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I. INTRODUCTION 
It has become common for statute to modify the civil liability of public 
authorities. This development is illustrated in Australia by limitations upon 
the availability of remedies to enforce common law obligations of public 
authorities, specifically the duty of care in negligence. Statute now sets a 
threshold for the liability of public authorities in negligence that is expressed 
by reference to administrative law standards. Here, statute is “an alien 
intruder in the house of the common law,”1 not just because the common law 
of obligations is disrupted, but also because public law obligations constrain 
the scope of private law obligations. It is true that the common law already 
qualified the obligations of public authorities in the law of negligence. 
However, the special position of public authorities was reinforced and given 
an ostentatiously administrative law façade by reforms that included a 
statutory “policy defense.” The reception of this alien statutory intruder has 
been mixed.  
Before and after statutory intervention, the administrative law standards 
defining the limits of liability of public authorities in negligence have been 
uncertain in their operation. A key question that emerged in the United 
Kingdom is whether the action or omission of the public authority claimed to 
be negligent is so unreasonable no reasonable authority could have reached 
 
* Professor, Sydney Law School, Member, New South Wales Bar. 
1  Andrew Burrows, The Relationship Between Common Law and Statute in the Law of 
Obligations, 128 L.Q. REV. 232, 232 (2012) (quoting Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United 
States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1936)). 
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it. This is the well-known administrative law standard of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness,2 developed in judicial review. However, as a threshold for 
obligations in tort law, the content and operation of the Wednesbury standard 
strayed from its judicial review origins. The administrative law standard was 
in any event evolving, developing as a more relaxed and diffuse test than the 
standard that was borrowed to limit the liability of public authorities in tort. 
This presents the real prospect of a bifurcation of principle, leaving the 
threshold for the operation of tortious obligations of public authorities quite 
different from concepts of reasonableness in administrative law.  
To appreciate the impact of administrative law standards on private law 
liability of public authorities, consideration is given in Part II to the common 
law and policy background into which the statutory intervention intruded. 
Part III describes the recommendations for reform that led to the introduction 
of the statutory limitation upon tort liability of public authorities. Part IV 
examines the key components of the reform in New South Wales, including 
the “policy” defense. The conclusion in Part V identifies the evolution of the 
concept of unreasonableness in administrative law, suggesting its 
implications for the limitation on the tort liability of public authorities. 
II. COMMON LAW AND POLICY BACKGROUND 
The common law accepts that public authorities may be liable in tort in 
accordance with the ordinary principles in the same way as a private person 
in the absence of express statutory authority to engage in the activity harming 
the other person.3 In Australia, the Commonwealth Constitution requires that 
the rights of parties shall “as nearly as possible” be the same in any litigation 
between government and private parties.4 This includes tort actions. It is 
plainly an aspiration which incorporates a recognition that there may be 
limits to equality in the common law of obligations.5 Inherited Crown 
immunities from tortious liability were removed by statute.6 However, there 
remained an understanding that the nature and responsibilities of government 
precluded complete equality as to tortious obligations, that limitations upon 
liability are properly imposed at common law, and that the limitations owe 
 
2 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 KB 223 (Eng.).  
3 See Commonwealth v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471 (Austl.); Stovin v. Wise [1996] AC 923 (HL) 
946; Council of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 458 (Austl.); Anns v. Merton 
London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 (HL). The tort action of misfeasance in public office is different 
and for present purposes may be put aside, as it is an action that lies against a public authority but not a 
private person. Unlawful action under administrative law standards is one element of the tort of 
misfeasance, but the mental element sets a bar so high that liability is rarely established. 
4 Australian Constitution s 75(iii). 
5 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 556 (Austl.). 
6 Crown Proceedings Act 1988 (Cth) s 5(2) (Austl.); Claims Against the Government and Crown 
Suits Act 1912 (Cth) s 2(1) (Austl.), and counterpart legislation in other States and the Territories. 
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something to principles of public law. The content of the limitations has been 
a live issue in Australia as in the United Kingdom.  
At the least, a public authority should not be liable in tort for doing what 
parliament has authorised it to do. Thus Lord Diplock in Home Office v. 
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd.7 proposed that a court would only have jurisdiction to 
determine an action in negligence against a public authority (and impliedly 
there could only be a duty of care) if the act or omission complained of did 
not fall “within the statutory limits imposed upon the . . . authority’s 
discretion.”8 In Dorset Yacht, the House of Lords famously held that officers 
responsible for the care and custody of young boys who were trainees held at 
a Borstal authority owed a duty of care to members of the public who suffered 
loss or damage when the trainees escaped and caused damage to their 
property. An officer had a duty of care if he or she acted contrary to relevant 
instructions from the Home Office relating to control of the trainees, since 
such action would be ultra vires in the narrow sense. If the officer acted 
within the instructions, the court may still need to consider, without 
trespassing on the merits, whether the delegate acted ultra vires in that no 
“reasonable person could bona fide come to the conclusion”9 that the officer’s 
supervision, or the lack thereof, could have benefited the trainees as required 
by the instructions.  
Lord Diplock appeared to refer not just to the Wednesbury standard, 
namely whether a decision is so unreasonable no reasonable authority could 
have reached it. The reference was to “the limits of the discretion”10 given by 
statute to the officer. This would cover the entire gamut of grounds of review, 
including all the principles of narrow and broad ultra vires, or abuse of power, 
such as failing to take into account relevant considerations, taking into 
account irrelevant considerations, acting for an improper purpose, and acting 
on the basis of no evidence. 
A co-existing limitation upon the obligations of public authorities was 
introduced in Anns v. Merton Borough Council.11 Lord Wilberforce 
introduced a two-stage test. First, one asks whether there is a prima facie duty 
of care based on foreseeability of harm. The second question is whether there 
are reasons of public policy for excluding or restricting any such prima facie 
duty. In most cases, one goes quickly to the second question. Lord 
Wilberforce distinguished between the area of policy-making by public 
authorities, where a duty of care should not be imposed, and the operational 
 
7 [1970] AC 1004 (HL). 
8 Id. at 1067–68. 
9 Id. at 1068. 
10 Id. at 1069. 
11 Anns v. Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 (HL). 
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area, where it is easier to impose a common law duty of care.12 Accepting 
Lord Diplock’s approach in Dorset Yacht, he held that if an inspector decided 
to exercise a discretion to inspect the foundations of a development, but acted 
“otherwise than in the bona fide exercise of any discretion under the statute,” 
the inspector was exercising power at the operational level and had a duty of 
care to ensure that by-laws setting standards for the foundations were 
complied with.13 The policy/operational distinction often proved elusive in 
its practical application, attracted criticism, confinement, and ultimately 
rejection.14  
Another way of dealing with the issue is to say that if an exercise of 
power involves policy-making, the court cannot adjudicate on those matters 
and, therefore, cannot reach a conclusion that the decision is ultra vires, with 
the consequence that there is no duty of care in exercising the power.15 This 
is consistent with the limits of ultra vires in judicial review: the court is not 
to trespass on the merits of the decision but should simply apply the grounds 
of review which are tests of its legality. A discretionary decision as to the 
allocation of scarce resources is a good example of the merits component of 
a decision.16 
The deployment in the law of obligations in regard to negligence of 
administrative law concepts as to whether a decision is ultra vires did not 
garner universal enthusiasm. In X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire County Council,17 
Lord Browne-Wilkson expressly rejected a preliminary test of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness to determine whether a duty of care existed, preferring to 
focus on whether the exercise of the statutory discretion was unsuitable for 
judicial determination.18 However, the Wednesbury test apparently prevailed 
in Stovin v. Wise.19 A highway authority had omitted to exercise a statutory, 
discretionary power to require a landowner to remove a mound obscuring 
motorists’ vision at an intersection where an accident occurred. By a narrow 
majority, the authority was held not to have a duty of care to undertake the 
remedial work.  
Where a public authority takes positive action, its liability in tort is, in 
principle, the same as that of a private person but may be restricted by its 
statutory powers and duties. In Stovin, in the case of a failure to act, the 
 
12 Id. at 754. 
13 Id. at 760. 
14 See Robinson v. Chief Constable of W. Yorkshire Police [2018] AC 736 (HL) 774; Stovin v. 
Wise [1996] AC 923 (HL) 938–39, 951–52; Murphy v. Brentwood Dist. Council [1991] 1 AC 398 (HL) 
438. 
15 X (Minors) v. Bedfordshire Cty. Council [1995] 2 AC 633 (HL) 738–39. 
16 See id. at 738 (quoting Rowling v. Takaro Props. Ltd. [1988] AC 473 (HL) 501). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 736. 
19 Stovin [1996] AC at 953. 
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limitation question was posed by reference to irrationality. Lord Hoffmann 
asked whether, in the circumstances of the case, it would have been 
“irrational for the council not to have exercised the power, so that there was 
in effect a public law duty to act.” A second precondition to raising a duty of 
care of a public authority was that exceptional grounds existed for holding 
that the policy of the statute requires compensation to be paid to a person who 
suffers loss because the power was not exercised.20 Applying the first 
requirement, it would not have been irrational for the council not to do the 
work. Therefore, the inaction was within the council’s discretion. There was 
no duty in public law to do the work, and there was no common law duty of 
care to do so. In any event, the second precondition, based on exceptional 
grounds, was not met, as a duty of care should not be imposed in relation to 
an exercise of a discretionary power involving budgetary considerations.  
Stovin was not entirely consistent with Dorset, Yacht, and Anns. It at 
least raised a question as to whether the exceptional grounds precondition 
assumed that some pure policy-making is the subject of a duty of care.21 The 
meaning of irrationality could be gauged by referring to a judicial review 
decision of the House of Lords, Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister 
for the Civil Service22 (“QCHQ”), decided after Dorset Yacht, and Anns, and 
before Stovin. Lord Diplock deployed the term “irrationality” as part of a 
threefold classification of grounds of review. Irrationality meant Wednesbury 
unreasonableness, which is established where a “decision . . . is so outrageous 
in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person 
who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at 
it.”23  
In Australia, the United Kingdom tests for qualifying the obligations of 
public authorities were followed, and also critiqued, and started to lose their 
attraction. The policy/operational distinction was criticised as being 
unhelpful, possibly to be relegated to the breach stage rather than the duty 
stage.24 In Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman,25 which introduced a general 
reliance test for a public authority’s duty of care, Judge Mason said that there 
is no compelling reason for confining a duty of care of a public authority to 
a situation where it acts in excess of power.26 Moreover, where a public 
authority is under no duty to exercise a discretionary power, it may place 
itself in a position that attracts a duty of care which calls for the exercise of 
 
20 Id. (Hoffmann, L.J.) (Goff, L.J. and Jauncey, L.J., concurring) (Nicholls, L.J. and Slynn, L.J., 
dissenting). 
21 Id. 
22 Council of Civil Serv. Unions v. Minister for the Civil Serv. [1985] 1 AC 374 (HL). 
23 Id. at 410. 
24 Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 333–34 (Gummow J) (Austl.). 
25 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1984) 157 CLR 424 (Austl.). 
26 Council of the Shire of Sutherland v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 458 (Mason J) (Austl.). 
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the power because the plaintiff generally depends upon the authority to 
perform its functions with due care.27 Disagreeing with Lord Wilberforce in 
Anns, Judge Mason said that a public authority may have a duty to give proper 
consideration to exercising its discretionary statutory power, enforceable by 
mandamus, although this is not of itself a foundation for a duty of care.28  
Administrative law standards remained a component of the test as to 
whether a duty of care arises. In Pyrenees Shire Council v Day,29 Chief 
Justice Brennan agreed with Lord Hoffmann’s irrationality test on the basis 
that if a decision not to exercise a statutory discretionary power were rational, 
then there should not be a common law duty of care to exercise the power.30 
The underlying reasoning is that the common law of negligence should not 
be inconsistent with the statute. This also means that where the circumstances 
enliven a duty at common law to exercise the statutory discretion, enforceable 
by a public law remedy such as mandamus, it is consistent with the legislative 
intention that there be a common law duty of care. It is not necessary to find 
a private statutory right to sue for breach of statutory duty. Further, according 
to Chief Justice Brennan, the standard of care is “no greater than the measure 
of the public law duty to exercise the power.”31  
The differing views of Judge Mason in Heyman and Chief Justice 
Brennan in Pyrenees reflected persisting disagreement within the Court as to 
the relationship between administrative law standards and the duty of care. 
Further, Judge McHugh expressly disagreed with the test of Lord Hoffmann 
in Stovin, taking the view that public law concepts of duty and private law 
notions of duty are informed by differing rationales.32 A statutory authority 
should not be immune from liability simply because its decision is intra vires, 
nor should it be in breach of a duty of care simply because its decision is ultra 
vires.33 Specifically, Judge McHugh rejected the project of “directly 
incorporating public law tests into negligence.”34  
Despite the view of Chief Justice Brennan, rejection of the importation 
of the ultra vires test dominated. In 2001, the High Court, by majority, 
overturned a long-standing discrete principle that an authority with power to 
construct and maintain highways could only owe a road user a duty of care 
in a case where it exercised its power and had no duty of care in a case of 
 
27 Id. at 464. 
28 Id. at 465. 
29 Pyrenees Shire Council (1998) 192 CLR 330 (Austl.). 
30 Id. at 346 (Brennan CJ). 
31 Id. at 347–48 (Brennan CJ). 
32 Crimmins v Stevedoring Indus Fin Comm (1999) 200 CLR 1, 35 (McHugh J) (Austl.). 
33 Id. at 35–36 (agreeing with the view expressed by Doyle QC (as he then was) in “Tort Liability 
for the Exercise of Statutory Powers,” in P. D. FINN, ESSAYS ON TORT LAW 235 (P. D. Finn ed. 1989)). 
34 Id. at 36. 
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non-feasance.35 In Brodie v Singleton Shire Council,36 highway authorities 
lost their special immunity for non-feasance and were held to have a duty of 
care to road users to take reasonable steps within a reasonable time to address 
a risk, including with regard to latent dangers.37 By that stage, a general test 
for the existence in a novel case of a duty of care was settled in the United 
Kingdom based on what is fair, just, and reasonable.38 The High Court 
rejected that test.39 Coherence in the law required that a duty in the law of 
obligations should be compatible with other legal duties, including those to 
be observed in exercising a statutory power.40 Therefore, a duty of care 
should not be owed by a public authority or its officers so as to create an 
obligation that conflicted with existing duties in exercising statutory power.41  
The test of whether a public authority owed a novel duty of care evolved 
and depended upon the presence of a loose group of salient features. These 
are: the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the extent of the authority’s 
power or control over the risk of harm to the plaintiff; whether the plaintiff 
is vulnerable in the sense of reasonably being able to protect himself or 
herself against the harm in question; the authority’s knowledge of the risk of 
harm to the plaintiff; whether a duty would encroach upon the authority’s 
core policy making or quasi-legislative functions; and whether a duty would 
be incompatible with the terms, purpose, or scope of the statute conferring 
the power exercised; or whether the case is concerned with pure economic 
loss and the application of principles in that field deny the existence of a 
duty.42 The last feature, along with the element of control, has been directly 
operative in excluding a duty of care where the intervention of the law of 
obligations is incompatible with the authority’s obligations and relationship 
with the plaintiff.43 
III. IPP REVIEW 
In 2002, a panel was established to review the law of negligence in 
Australia. When addressing the tort liability of public authorities, the panel 
 
35 Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512, 513 (Austl.). 
36 Id. at 514. 
37 Id. at 513. 
38 Caparo Indus. PLC v. Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL) 617–18. 
39 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 579–80 (Austl.). 
40 Id. at 579–81. 
41 Id. at 582. 
42 Key salient features in a summary by Allsop P. in Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar 
(2009) 75 NSWLR 649, 676 (Austl.) (referring to High Court development of the features, in Crimmins v 
Stevedoring Indus Fin Comm (1999) 200 CLR 1, 39 (Austl.)). See also Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 
237 CLR 215, 254, 261–62, 266 (Austl.); Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 
596–97, 577–78 (Austl.).  
43 Sullivan (2001) 207 CLR at 582; Graham Barclay Oysters (2002) 211 CLR at 596–600.  
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focussed on a perceived need to deal with Brodie,44 which had exposed 
highway authorities to liability for non-feasance. Its report, the Ipp Review, 
recommended statutory regulation of the liability of public and other 
authorities. The discussion in the Ipp Review referred generally to the need 
for a “policy defense” and particularly discussed Stovin in that context. 
However, only Recommendation 39 was in terms a “policy defense,” in that 
it expressly referred to policy-making decisions. This recommendation 
weaved in a Wednesbury test. Other recommendations did not specifically 
refer to policy-making decisions.  
The Ipp Review specifically recommended that roads and park 
authorities should be free of any duty of care when they make budgetary 
decisions about management of roads and parks, since proper performance 
of their functions may require them to make facilities available in the public 
interest rather than withdraw them for fear of liability in negligence.45 Having 
accepted this, the same qualified immunity should be extended to other public 
authorities, such as prison authorities and air-traffic control authorities when 
performing their public functions. While a distinction between public and 
private functions could not be attempted, the limitation upon liability should 
be available in relation to any function requiring the balancing of the interests 
of individuals against a public interest, or the taking into account of 
competing demands on the authority’s resources. A public authority’s 
decision about expending resources on maintaining its fleet of vehicles to 
proper standards would not be an exercise of a public function. The limitation 
upon liability should be available not just to public authorities but to any 
entity exercising or failing to exercise a public function.46 This would cover, 
for example, corporations exercising or failing to exercise public functions 
outsourced to them by government.  
This reasoning prompted the central recommendation that Australia 
should “follow the lead” of the United Kingdom in Stovin. An exercise or 
non-exercise by a public or other authority of a public function based on a 
“policy decision,” being a decision about the allocation of scarce resources 
or financial, economic, political, or social considerations as to the public 
interest, does not sound in liability unless the decision was so unreasonable 
that no reasonable decision-maker in the defendant’s position could have 
made it.47 This was not to negate a duty of care, but rather to lower the 
standard of care required in the exercise of public functions, to a threshold 
defined by the administrative law standard of Wednesbury 
 
44 DAVID A. IPP ET AL., REVIEW OF THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE: FINAL REPORT 157 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2002) [hereinafter IPP REVIEW]. 
45 Id. at 155. 
46 Id. at 156–57. 
47 Id. at 157. 
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unreasonableness.48 There was a degree of ambiguity in this 
recommendation. The formal recommendation was that the limitation was 
only to apply where an authority actually made a decision, and the decision 
was based substantially on resource allocation constraints or some other 
political or policy consideration.49  
This was not the only recommendation for limiting the liability of public 
and other authorities. As mentioned above, the common law already required 
that in order to establish a novel duty of care certain “salient features” must 
be present.50 One is that the imposition of the duty would not impose upon a 
public authority liability with respect to the exercise of core policy-making 
functions.51 Other salient features are that no duty of care is imposed in 
relation to decisions which involve or are dictated by financial, economic, 
social, or political factors or constraints,52 and that the duty of care be 
compatible with the terms, purpose, or scope of the statute conferring the 
power.53 The Ipp Review referred to the last mentioned salient feature and 
recommended that it be made a statutory precondition to liability of a public 
authority for tortious exercise or non-exercise of statutory public functions.54  
By time of the Ipp Review, United Kingdom courts had reiterated the 
doubts expressed by Lord Hoffmann in Stovin as to the adequacy of the 
policy-operational distinction.55 The theme in X (Minors) of the clash of 
public law concepts introduced into the law of negligence had also been taken 
up by other members of the House of Lords. It was recognized56 that Stovin 
was confined to the issue of liability in a case of an omission or non-feasance 
by a highway authority, not positive conduct, and that the common law treats 
omissions differently (as Lord Hoffmann had noted in Stovin).57 The mere 
fact that a public authority exercised a discretionary statutory power was not 
 
48 Id. at 157.  
49 Id. at 158. 
50 See supra text accompanying notes 42, 43. 
51 See Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1998) 192 CLR 330, 393–94 [182] (Austl.); Sutherland 
Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424, 500 (Austl.). 
52 Sutherland Shire Council (1985) 157 CLR at 469. 
53 See Caltex Refineries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar (2009) 75 NSWLR 649, 676 [102]–[103] (Austl.); 
Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 577–78 [84] (McHugh J), 597–80 [146] 
(Gummow J) (Austl.); Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 579–80 [50] (Austl.). 
54 IPP REVIEW, supra note 44, Recommendation 41, at 160 [10.36]–[10.37]. Not considered here 
is the Ipp Review recommendation with regard to breach of statutory duty, dealt with in Recommendation 
42, at 163. 
55 Barrett v. Enfield London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 550, 571–72 (HL); Phelps v. 
Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619, 658, 665, 673–74 (HL). Division had also emerged 
as to outcomes of the application to a public authority of the fair, just, and reasonable test: Barrett [2001] 
2 AC at 586. 
56 Barrett [2001] 2 AC at 586. 
57 Stovin v. Wise [1996] AC at 953 (HL). 
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enough to preclude a duty of care.58 In a case of alleged negligence of a local 
authority as to the manner in which it exercises its statutory duty or power, 
there was no preliminary test based on the Wednesbury standard. Rather, 
attention was given to whether imposing a duty of care would interfere with 
performance by the public authority of its statutory duty or discharge of its 
statutory power,59 and whether the decision was unsuitable for judicial 
determination.60  
Soon after the Ipp Review, Lord Hoffmann, the author of the rationality 
test in Stovin, clarified the limited operation it was intended to have in 
Gorringe v. Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council.61 First, Stovin re-
affirmed the common law principle that where the empowering statute does 
not on its proper construction give a private right of action, it cannot generate 
a duty of care in private law.62 Secondly, the discussion of irrationality in 
Stovin was only in the alternative, or obiter, referring to what would have 
been the nature of the duty if there had been a duty of care. The obiter answer 
was that the authority would not have been liable. It would not have been 
irrational in a public law sense not to exercise the statutory power to do the 
work.63 So characterised, irrationality is a test of the standard of care, not a 
test as to whether a duty of care exists. The obiter in Stovin raised a test of 
irrationality only with regard to non-feasance, where an authority omits to 
exercise a statutory power or makes a decision to not exercise the power.64 
Nonetheless the Ipp Review’s recommendation to follow the lead of 
Stovin, understanding Stovin to have introduced a general rationality 
threshold for tortious liability in respect of the exercise of a function 
involving a “policy decision” was implemented. Legislation, described 
below, was drafted to give that understanding statutory force. Irrationality 
meant acting in a manner that was Wednesbury unreasonable. The 
Wednesbury test was to apply not just to highway authorities but to all public 
or other authorities. It was to apply not just to non-feasance but to any 
exercise of a statutory power. The recommendations of the Ipp Review did 
not just follow Stovin but extended the dictum in Stovin to cover a vast field 
of administrative action and inaction, given that a policy decision cannot 
 
58 Barrett [2001] 2 AC at 586; Phelps [2001] 2 AC at 653. 
59 Phelps [2001] 2 AC at 653.  
60 Barrett [2001] 2 AC at 586. 
61 Gorringe v. Calderdale Metro. Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 (HL). 
62 Id. at [23], [25]–[26]; see also Michael v. Chief Constable of S. Wales Police [2012] EWCA 
Civ 981 [111] (Eng.). 
63 Gorringe [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057 [26]. 
64 Gorringe was a case of nonfeasance by failure to paint a “Slow” sign on a hill on a roadway. 
Id. The council had not made the road more dangerous by some positive act. Id. It was not liable for injury 
to a motorist who had an accident when she stopped suddenly at the crest of the hill. Id. 
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readily be distinguished from other decisions that might be described as 
operational.  
IV. STATUTORY LIMITATION OF LIABILITY OF PUBLIC 
AUTHORITIES 
The recommendations of the Ipp Review relating to public and other 
authorities were implemented, in whole or in part but not in a uniform 
manner, in all but two jurisdictions in Australia.65 In New South Wales, Part 
5 of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (“CL Act”) expressly and directly 
limited the civil liability of public or other authorities, save for liability for 
certain intentional torts and certain claims covered by a statutory scheme.66 
The expression “public or other authority” was carefully defined.67 The 
reform implemented the recommendation of the Ipp Review that “other 
authorities,” being private sector entities exercising outsourced governmental 
functions, should enjoy the limitation upon liability.  
A. Non-feasance 
Section 45 of the CL Act gives road authorities immunity from liability 
in respect of non-feasance.68 This is the answer to Brodie. Section 44(1) is 
also important with regard to non-feasance and applies to any public 
authority or other authority. The authority is not liable in proceedings for civil 
liability to the extent that the liability is based on the authority’s failure to 
exercise, or to consider exercising, a function of the authority to prohibit or 
regulate an activity, if the authority could not have been required to exercise 
the function in proceedings instituted by the plaintiff. A function of 
regulating an activity includes a power to issue a license, permit or other 
authority in respect of an activity, or to register or authorize a person in 
connection with an activity.69  
To require that the authority “could not have been required to exercise 
the function in proceedings instituted by the plaintiff” appears to mean that 
the plaintiff could not have obtained mandamus in judicial review 
 
65 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) ch 2 pt 3 div 1 (Austl.); Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (“CL 
Act”) ss 3B, 3C, 40–46 (Austl.); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) pt 1C (Austl.); Civil Liability Act 2002 
(Tas) pt 9 (Austl.); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) ss 108–114 (Austl.); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) pt 
XII (Austl.). In South Australia and the Northern Territory, the IPP REVIEW recommendations were not 
implemented. 
66 CL Act s 3B (workers compensation and in part motor accidents).  
67 CL Act s 41. The definitions of “public authority” in other States and Territories differ: Wrongs 
Act 1958 (Vic) s 79 (Austl.). 
68 CL Act s 45. 
69 CL Act s 44(2). 
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proceedings to compel the authority to exercise the function. Section 44 
identifies a true non-feasance case at common law. A failure by a consent 
authority to attach conditions to a grant of development consent has been held 
not to be a failure to which Section 44 applies.70 In that context, the 
“function” of the consent authority is simply the function of assessing and 
determining the development application. The power to impose conditions 
on the consent is referred to in the same section as the power to grant or refuse 
consent and cannot be treated as a separate power where non-feasance may 
occur.71 Thus, where a consent authority granted development consent and 
imposed conditions but not a condition of the kind claimed to be required, 
there was no non-feasance, and section 44 did not apply.72  
Section 44 works with another limitation applying generally (introduced 
to implement general recommendations of the Ipp Review not directed 
specifically to public authorities). This is that a defendant does not owe a 
duty of care to another person to warn of an obvious risk to the plaintiff, 
where the risk in the circumstances would have been obvious to a reasonable 
person in the position of that person.73 
Section 44 makes the availability of a remedy in public law a condition 
for the liability of a public or other authority in private law, and, hence, 
exposure to the private law remedy of damages. In judicial review 
proceedings, a public authority can be compelled to perform a statutory duty 
or to exercise a discretionary power whose exercise has been enlivened by 
the issue of mandamus or a mandatory injunction. Thus, in case of failure to 
act, the availability of a public law remedy is a precondition to imposing 
liability in negligence upon a public authority.  
B. “Policy” Defense 
Sections 42 and 43A of the CL Act are the provisions properly described 
as a “policy defense.”74 Section 42 states “principles” to be applied, rather 
than setting a standard of conduct. Section 42(b) provides that it is a 
“principle” that the general allocation by an authority of financial and other 
 
70 Bankstown City Council v Zraika (2016) 94 NSWLR 159, 180–81 [107] (Austl.). 
71 Id. at [96]. 
72 Id. at [98]–[99]. 
73 CL Act ss 5H, 5F. 
74 Section 43(2) provides that an act or omission of a public or other authority does not constitute 
a breach of statutory duty unless the act or omission was in the circumstances so unreasonable that no 
authority having the functions of the authority in question could properly consider the act or omission to 
be a reasonable exercise of its functions. CL Act s 43(2). The impact of implementation of the Ipp Review 
recommendations in relation to actions for breach of statutory duty, in particular, the impact of section 43, 
is not considered here. Nor is further consideration given to CL Act section 46, which provides that a 
positive decision by a public authority to exercise or not to exercise a function does not of itself indicate 
a duty to exercise the function in particular circumstances or in a particular way. CL Act s 46. 
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resources is “not open to challenge.”75 More generally under section 42(a), it 
is a principle that in determining whether there is a duty of care or a breach 
of a duty of care, the functions required to be exercised by an authority are 
limited by the financial and other resources reasonably available to the 
authority for exercising those functions.76  
For example, the operation of an airport is a function limited by the 
financial and other resources reasonably available to the airport authority. As 
a consequence, the local council, which owned and controlled Kempsey 
Aerodrome, owed no duty of care to the owner of an aircraft that collided 
with a kangaroo when landing. The principles in section 42(a) and (b) were 
engaged. Any standard of care was not breached for failure to build a 1.8 
metre kangaroo-proof fence around the airport boundary or failure to warn 
users of the aerodrome that kangaroo incursions had increased to dangerous 
levels.77  
Section 43A was inserted into the CL Act later, in 2003.78 Although the 
CL Act was not intended to create any cause of action,79 section 43A assumes 
that there is a duty of care in exercising some statutory powers. Section 
43A(3) makes Wednesbury unreasonableness a precondition to establishing 
liability in negligence. Section 43A applies where liability in proceedings is 
based on a public or other authority’s exercise of, or failure to exercise, a 
“special statutory power.” A special statutory power is defined as a power 
conferred by or under a statute and of a kind that persons generally are not 
authorized to exercise without specific statutory authority. This is a broad 
test, which captures most statutory powers, but probably not those that confer 
a capacity to act similar to a capacity of a natural person. Section 43A 
provides that an act or omission involving an exercise of, or failure to 
exercise, a special statutory power does not give rise to civil liability unless 
the act or omission was in the circumstances so unreasonable that no 
authority having the special statutory power in question could properly 
consider the act or omission to be a reasonable exercise of, or failure to 
 
75 CL Act s 42(b). This covers functions that public or other authorities are required to exercise 
and extends to functions exercised in response to requirements imposed by the needs of the community 
under local government legislation: Kempsey Shire Council v Five Star Med Centre Pty Ltd [2018] 
NSWCA 308 (Austl.). Counterpart provisions to CL Act section 42 are: Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 
35 (Austl.); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5W (Austl.); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) s 38 (Austl.); Civil 
Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) s 110 (Austl.); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 83 (Austl.).  
76 CL Act s 42(a). 
77 Kempsey [2018] NSWCA at [55]–[65]. 
78 The insertion of the additional section appears to have been trigged by the decision in Presland 
v Hunter Area Health Serv [2003] NSWSC 754 (Austl.). See Precision Prods (NSW) Pty Ltd v 
Hawkesbury City Council [2008] NSWCA 278 [167] (Austl.).  
79 MM Constrs (Aust) Pty Ltd v Port Stephens Council (2012) 191 LGERA 292, 346–47 [214] 
(Basten JA) (Austl.). 
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exercise, its power. In a case of a special statutory power to prohibit or 
regulate an activity, section 43A(3) applies in addition to section 44.80 
Section 43A was based on the reasoning in the Ipp Review, apparently 
intended to give statutory form to Stovin.81 Since section 43A applies to any 
act or omission by a public authority that involves an exercise of, or failure 
to exercise, a special statutory power, and adopts the Wednesbury test, the 
ambit of section 43A is broader than the principles in play in Stovin or 
Gorringe. Stovin was concerned with whether there was a duty of care, but 
section 43A assumes that there is a duty of care and sets a standard of care, 
of not acting Wednesbury unreasonable. Later, in Gorringe, irrationality is 
characterized not as a threshold test for the existence of a duty of care but as 
part of the standard of care and, hence, an indicator of breach of duty.82 
Perhaps it was a fluke that section 43A, enacted before Gorringe was 
decided, set a standard of care instead of attempting to regulate the generation 
of a duty of care. Section 43A goes further than Stovin in another respect. 
The discussion of irrationality in Stovin was confined to the context of non-
feasance. Section 43A(3) applies to acts or omissions. Moreover, Stovin and 
Gorringe spoke of irrationality. Section 43A contains a Wednesbury test, 
rather than the more general concept of irrationality which would demand a 
higher standard of conduct.  
Section 43A has been described as conferring a qualified immunity on 
an authority, and at the same time is about the standard of care rather than the 
duty of care.83 Once it is established that the decision-maker exercised a 
special statutory power and that its liability is “based on” that power, the 
remaining question is the alteration, by force of section 43A, of the applicable 
standard of care. In a case where section 43A is raised, meeting the 
Wednesbury hurdle may appear to be the weakest link in the plaintiff’s case. 
The Court may be encouraged and agree to focus on section 43A, even 
though it has not yet formed a view as to whether the authority has a novel 
duty of care.84 The dynamics of a tort action against a public authority are 
transformed so that the standard of care displaces the duty of care as the 
centerpiece of the proceedings and interrogation of that standard imports 
administrative law standards. Thus, section 43A presented a bar to the 
proceedings in Precision Products (NSW) Party Ltd v Hawkesbury City 
 
80 CL Act s 43A(4); Bankstown City Council v Zraika (2016) 94 NSWLR 159 (Austl.). 
81 Compare Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) s 5X (Austl.), with Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld) s 36 
(Austl.) (containing no exact counterpart in the other jurisdictions that implemented IPP REVIEW 
recommendations). 
82 Gorringe v. Calderdale Metro Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15, [2004] 1 WLR 1057, 1065–
66 (HL); see also Curtis v Harden Shire Council [2014] 88 NSWLR 10, 71 [272] (Basten, JA) (Austl.). 
83 Road & Mar Servs v Grant [2015] NSWCA 138 [57] (Austl.). 
84 E.g., Zraika (2016) 94 NSWLR at 180–81 [107]. 
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Council.85 The Court of Appeal held that the issue of a clean-up notice, 
although it was disproportionate to the pollution incident and stopped the 
recipient’s business, was conduct that was not Wednesbury unreasonable. 
The standard of care was not breached and therefore the proceedings were 
precluded by section 43A(3).  
Section 43A expressly adopts the language of the Wednesbury test. 
Applying ordinary principles of interpretation, it would be erroneous to place 
a gloss on the statutory provision, interpreting the test as one of 
“irrationality.”86 However, after living with section 43A for ten years, the 
Court of Appeal has baulked at applying the strict administrative law 
standard of Wednesbury to limit the tort liability of public authorities. In 
Curtis v. Harden Shire Council,87 a motorist was killed when she lost control 
of her vehicle on loose gravel on a section of roadway that was being 
resurfaced. It was accepted that the local council with the function of road 
maintenance owed a duty of care to road users in carrying out maintenance 
work, including the placement of appropriate warning signs. This was a case 
of misfeasance, the responsible council officer having made a decision that a 
warning sign was not needed. Since the council’s powers with respect to road 
maintenance were “special statutory powers,” section 43A set the standard of 
care.  
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the tests in section 43A had its 
origins in the Wednesbury case, with a veiled comment that the difficulties 
experienced in applying the test to public law must be magnified when the 
test is transported to private law.88 The Court noted that while judicial review 
cases “may inform”89 consideration of the application of section 43A, and 
that the terms of section 43A “are said to find inspiration”90 in the 
Wednesbury ground of review in administrative law, the remedies in each 
context are quite different.91 In the context of judicial review, Wednesbury 
provides a basis for intervention to declare an exercise of power invalid, 
while in the context of a negligence action the power is assumed to have been 
exercised and the remedy is liability to pay damages. For the purposes of tort 
law, it is immaterial whether the exercise of power was valid or invalid.  
Ultimately, in Curtis, the Court did not impose the high standard of the 
Wednesbury test applied in judicial review. The primary judge had asked 
 
85 Precision Prods (NSW) Pty Ltd v Hawkesbury City Council (2008) 74 NSWLR 102, 142–79 
(Austl.). 
86 Allianz Austl Ins Ltd v Roads & Traffic Auth of NSW [2010] NSWCA 328, 388 (Austl.). 
87 Curtis [2014] 88 NSWLR 10; see also [2015] HCATrans 14 (the High Court refused special 
leave to appeal). 
88 Curtis [2014] 88 NSWLR at 14 [5] (Bathurst, CJ) (Austl.); see also id. at 68 [257] (Basten, JA). 
89 Id. at 14 [6] (Bathurst CJ). 
90 Id. at 69 [262] (Basten JA).  
91 Id.  
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whether minds might differ as to the need for additional signage, and on 
answering that question in the affirmative, concluded that the Wednesbury 
test was not met. Applying section 43A, the council had not failed to meet 
the standard of care. Allowing the appeal, the Court of Appeal did not ask 
whether the council’s failure to install the signs was so unreasonable no 
reasonable authority could have so acted. Instead, the Court asked whether 
the council could properly consider its exercise of power was a reasonable 
exercise of power.92 That is, within the range of possible opinions as to what 
would be a reasonable action or omission, is it the case that no public 
authority properly considering the issue could place the decision within that 
range? After all, section 43A(3) uses the words “could properly consider the 
act or omission to be . . . reasonable.” While Wednesbury poses an objective 
standard for a court to apply in judicial review, the awkward attempt to 
achieve a statutory formulation left open an interpretation of the test as a 
question of whether any authority could reasonably regard the act or omission 
as a reasonable exercise or failure to exercise the power.  
Instead of forming its own view, the court is to apply the view of an 
objective reasonable authority, probably one with similar functions similar to 
those of the defendant council. Justice Basten in Curtis suggested that this 
test is like the fair-minded observer test applied when a court asks in judicial 
review whether apprehended bias has been established.93 However, the fair-
minded observer is a lay observer who has only a certain level of information 
as to the circumstances and the applicable law. By contrast, the objective 
public authority observer is familiar with exercising the function, and indeed 
is an expert in that regard.  
This is dramatically illustrated in Curtis, in that the Court admitted 
evidence from authority officers and other experts as to what they thought 
was a reasonable approach to the issue of signage. The traffic control plan 
the council officer selected for the section of road was appropriate, but 
according to the manual that plan required a slippery road sign to remain in 
place until loose aggregate had been removed, along with either a reduce 
speed sign or a lower speed limit. The responsible officer’s superior officer, 
who no longer worked for the council, gave evidence that the decision to omit 
the signs made no sense. The view of the former superior officer prevailed 
over other expert evidence.  
The upshot in the appeal in Curtis was that the plaintiff satisfied the 
onus of establishing that no authority could have considered reasonable the 
decision not to provide the signage. Therefore, the standard in section 43A 
was not met and the council had breached the standard of care.  
 
92 Id. at 14 [6] (Bathurst CJ); see also id. at 72 [277] (Basten JA). 
93 Id. at 72 [278]. 
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Even the Curtis test of the objective reasonable authority seems to be 
controversial, at least as to its application in differing cases. In Bankstown 
City Council v Zraika,94 the primary judge sought to apply a test of the 
“hypothetical responsible authority” in order to determine whether a council 
breached the section 43A standard of care by failing to impose a condition 
claimed to be appropriate in a development consent. This condition would 
have required different signage at an intersection, less conducive to an 
accident. That was the wrong test.95 Confident that it was adopting the Curtis 
test, the Court of Appeal held that the primary judge had erred because it had 
not been shown that no reasonable council could properly have approved the 
development application without imposing the condition claimed to be 
appropriate.96 Even if the council owed a duty of care, there was no breach 
of the duty, applying the section 43A standard.97  
The outcome of application of the Curtis objective reasonable authority 
test will be unpredictable, turning upon the evaluation of expert evidence. 
Moreover, the test seems far removed from the Wednesbury test. In a judicial 
review action evidence is ordinarily confined to the material that was before 
the decision-maker when the decision was made, and only in an exceptional 
case is expert evidence admitted to establish the Wednesbury ground.98 The 
section 43A test is no longer an administrative law standard of conduct.  
V. CONCLUSION 
It is not surprising that the awkward intruder, section 43A, has been 
criticized.99 If Stovin had indeed provided the lead, a more general and lower 
standard of irrationality could have been adopted in order to limit the liability 
of public authorities, rather than the Wednesbury standard. In judicial review, 
the Wednesbury ground is rarely established. Other grounds of judicial 
review, which are more readily established, are not in terms framed as tests 
of irrationality or unreasonableness, but in substance are concerned with it. 
Examples are failing to take into account relevant considerations, taking into 
account irrelevant contains and acting on the basis of no evidence. These are 
also standards that might have contributed to setting a standard of care that is 
to operate as a threshold for bringing negligence proceedings against a public 
authority.  
 
94 Bankstown City Council v Zraika (2016) 94 NSWLR 159, 182 [111] (Austl.). 
95 Id. at 182–83 [116]. 
96 Id. at 185 [127]. 
97 Id.  
98 Australian Retailers Ass’n v Reserve Bank of Austl (2005) 148 FCR 446, 566 (Austl.). 
99 Justine Bell-James & Kit Barker, Public Authority Liability for Negligence in the Post–Ipp Era: 
Sceptical Reflections on the “Policy Defence”, 40 MELB. U. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2016); Mark Aronson, 
Government Liability in Negligence, 32 MELB. U. L. REV. 44, 76–81 (2008). 
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In any event, since 2013, another test of reasonableness or rationality 
has emerged that may in time result in the relaxation or replacement of the 
Wednesbury test or simply leave it redundant. This is the test in Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship v Li.100 By a presumption of law, any statutory 
discretionary power is taken to be required to be exercised reasonably.101 This 
is a legal standard of reasonableness indicated by the true construction of the 
statute and has support in the common law predating Wednesbury.102 An 
exercise or failure to exercise a power fails the Li unreasonableness test if it 
“lacks an evident and intelligible justification.”103 In Li itself, a tribunal’s 
refusal to grant an adjournment to an applicant was held to be Li unreasonable 
and therefore invalid. 
Li left confusion in its wake as to how this apparently more relaxed 
standard of reasonableness differed from Wednesbury, in particular since two 
members of the Court in Li concluded that it was the Wednesbury standard 
that had been breached, while maintaining that Wednesbury is established 
only in a rare case.104 The Wednesbury standard has sometimes also been 
described as a product of statutory implication, but now a decision-maker is 
required to meet the implied Li standard of reasonableness as well. It seems 
unlikely that two standards of reasonableness will persist.105 It will take time 
for the initial caution106 and uncertainty107 in the application of Li 
unreasonableness to subside and for the fate of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness to be resolved.  
It was only after the Ipp Review reforms that the High Court has 
articulated that Wednesbury was neither the starting point nor the end point 
for the standard of reasonableness.108 This is not lost on the Court of Appeal 
as it struggles to apply section 43A.109 The Wednesbury test enshrined in 
section 43A of the CL Act already resembles an artifact of an earlier era of 
administrative law, washed up on the shores of a private law domain, wary 
of uncontrolled tort liability of public authorities. The current position is that 
 
100 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, 349–52 (Austl.). 
101 Id. at 362, 363–64. 
102 Id. at 363. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 351–52, 373, 376–78. 
105 See Minister for Immigration & Border Prot v SZVFW (2018) 92 ALJR 713, 740 [135] (Austl.) 
(Edelman J) (stating that there is only one test of reasonableness). 
106 Compare Minister for Immigration & Border Prot v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437, 445, 450 
(Austl.), and Huynh v Minister for Immigration & Border Prot (2015) 232 FCR 497, 529 (Austl.), with 
Minister for Immigration & Border Prot v Stretton (2016) 237 FCR 1, 9, 72, 31–32 (Austl.) and Minister 
for Immigration & Border Prot v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158, 180 (Austl.). 
107 See SZVFW (2018) 92 ALJR 713 (reversing Full Federal Court decision involving an 
evaluative decision as to whether Li unreasonableness standard was met). 
108 Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, 364 (Austl.). 
109 Bankstown City Council v Zraika (2016) 94 NSWLR 159 (Austl.). 
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where a public authority’s act or omission is not invalid for Wednesbury 
unreasonableness but is invalid for Li unreasonableness, or on the basis of 
some other ground of review, the remedies of administrative law will be 
available, but the authority will not have failed to meet the required standard 
of care in tort law. 
The United Kingdom approach now, consolidating what Lord 
Hoffmann said in Gorringe, is that public authorities should be subject to the 
same general principles of the common law of negligence as private 
individuals without broad limitations upon liability justified by reference to 
public policy.110 There is a limitation, which is expressed in a more precise 
way. A duty of care may be excluded if inconsistent with the statutory scheme 
under which the public authority exercises power.111 
This is not far removed from the approach in Australia of identifying a 
novel duty of care. A duty of care is not established if it would impose upon 
a public authority liability with respect to the exercise of core policy-making 
functions or decisions that involve or are dictated by financial, economic, 
social, or political factors or constraints. This consideration is part of the 
salient feature requirement that a duty of care be compatible with the terms, 
purpose, or scope of the statute conferring the power.112 Limitations upon the 
tort liability of public authorities already exist in the principles governing the 
imposition of a duty of care. Statutory limitations imposed via a standard of 
care, such as section 43A, may be not only awkward but also unnecessary 
intruders in the private law of obligations.  
 
 
110 Poole Borough Council v. GN [2019] UKSC 25, [64]–[65], [75] (Eng.); Robinson v. Chief 
Constable of W. Yorkshire Police [2018] 2 AC 736, 736–748 [31]–[42] (Eng.). 
111 Poole Borough Council [2019] UKSC at [64]–[65], [75]. 
112 See supra notes 42, 43, 51–53 and accompanying text. 
